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TEACHING HEALTH LAW FROM A SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
LINDSAY F. WILEY* 
I started teaching health law relatively recently—in the fall of 2010, just 
after the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) was enacted, but before much of it had 
been implemented. This timing has been a blessing because I started with a 
fresh slate rather than adding the ACA on top of a previously developed 
course. It has also been a curse, but ultimately I appreciate that I started 
teaching the course at a time when the ACA was under constant threat. The 
ever-evolving nature of health law means that health law teachers must always 
bear in mind a goal that applies to all teaching: we must prepare students for 
the challenges they will face over the coming half-century without knowing 
exactly what those challenges will look like. Knowledge of current health law 
statutes, regulations, and case law serves primarily as the medium in which we 
practice skills together in the classroom. 
I.  SOME PRELIMINARIES 
With the twin goals of building knowledge and honing skills, I designed 
my survey course around a series of in-class exercises that occupy about three-
quarters of our time in class. Students work in groups of two to four to 
generate client advice, judicial memos, and guidance for state and federal 
lawmakers. In most cases, we work through these exercises after doing 
background reading and reviewing a basic outline of the key issues together as 
a class. While students work through the exercises, I circulate among the 
groups and dialogue with them about their process and ideas. Rather than 
having groups report back to the class in any formal way, I wrap up each 
exercise by calling on particular students to share specific insights with the 
group or to engage in a role-playing exercise. I encourage, but do not require, 
students to draft written responses to the in-class exercise prompts as part of 
their preparation for the final exam, which is modeled on the exercises. 
My course is designed to meet the needs of dabblers who are curious about 
health law but don’t expect to practice in the area. It also functions as an 
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introduction for beginning experts—those who know they are interested in 
practicing health law and will take several additional specialized courses. I am 
fortunate to work with a stellar group of health law practitioners from the 
Washington D.C. community who teach more than a dozen specialized health 
law courses as part-time faculty at American University. We have a large 
student body, and about fifteen percent of students express an interest in 
practicing health law. My course has been taught for four credits, though I am 
experimenting with a more intensive three-credit version in the spring 2017 
semester. I typically have between twenty and forty students in the class. 
My course is designed primarily for law students who have completed 
courses in torts, contracts, and constitutional law. Most of the students in my 
course are in the first semester of their second year of law school 
(constitutional law is a required first-year course), joined by a handful of third-
year students and typically two or three lawyers (many of whom trained at 
foreign law schools) who are taking the course as LL.M. students. Few of my 
students have completed a course in administrative law, though many of them 
are taking administrative law concurrently with the health law survey course. 
II.  THE SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL MODEL AS A BLUEPRINT FOR THE HEALTH LAW 
SURVEY COURSE 
With all of that in mind, the first year I taught the course I set out to 
identify some organizing themes. I’m a visual thinker, so I started with what 
my students now refer to as the “bullseye.” I draw it on the white board the 
first day and come back to it each time we transition from one major topic to 
the next. It is loosely based on the social-ecological model of health that drives 
my scholarly work in public health law, but with an emphasis on the health 
care sector. 
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Figure 1: The Social-Ecological Model of Health 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: A Social-Ecological Model of Health Care 
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Many colleagues (most influentially for me, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, 
Nicole Huberfeld, and Kevin Outterson when they introduced their newly 
published health law case book1 while it was still a work in progress) rightly 
point out that after the ACA, health law is no longer driven by private law. 
Nonetheless, I find private law is a great entry point for my students, most of 
whom are fresh off a first year curriculum that is heavy on torts and contracts. 
Medical malpractice law occupies an ever-smaller proportion of my course, but 
I find it to be a helpful starting point because it allows us to focus on the 
interaction between an individual health care provider and patient—something 
all my students have experienced first-hand. 
My approach to the health law survey class is heavily influenced by the 
population-level focus of my work as a public health law scholar. So why do I 
put the individual patient at the center of the bullseye? Why do I start with 
individualistic, relational health care encounters? Because those encounters are 
what virtually everyone thinks of when they think about health. It works well 
to meet students where they are and then gradually widen the lens to 
encompass other factors and a broader conception of health. And, after all, at 
the root of public health’s focus on collective needs and social justice is respect 
for the dignity of individual people. 
III.  HEALTH CARE AND INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY 
I start the course with informed consent and the ways in which civil 
liability is used as a tool to shape (and, initially at least, bring into being) 
discussion between doctor and patient about medical treatment. This is an 
intensely relational discussion, focused on the particular values a specific 
patient brings to the table and the particular assumptions, biases, and fears that 
influence a specific doctor. Immediately, however, I raise questions about 
other stakeholders outside the doctor-patient dyad. What about the hospital’s 
obligations? What considerations might it want the doctor and patient to take 
into account? What about the third-party payer and others who are within the 
same risk pool who will share the cost of premium increases as health care 
expenditures rise? Should the doctor share information about the relative cost 
of various treatment options? Do we expect the doctor to even know about the 
relative cost? 
Our discussion of the role cost considerations should play in doctor-patient 
decision-making leads us to consider the interests of the public as a whole with 
regard to other aspects of treatment. Should doctors discuss issues like 
antibiotic resistance or the need for a patient’s sexual partner or other contacts 
to seek medical attention? How far do these obligations extend? When students 
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push back against the idea that health care providers should consider anything 
but the needs of the patient, I sometimes ask them whether doctors should 
advise parents in a community with high vaccination rates to free-ride on herd 
immunity provided by others rather than have their children vaccinated, 
undertaking a minimal—but real—risk. My goal, influenced by Wendy 
Parmet’s excellent chapter on health care law in her book on viewing law (writ 
large) through a population health lens,2 is to encourage students to see the full 
range of interests at stake in decisions about medical treatment. This gradual 
widening of our lens provides a perfect introduction to the bullseye and allows 
me to introduce the public—and not merely the aggregation of individual 
patient interests—as a health law stakeholder, something I am also exploring in 
my scholarly work.3 
IV.  HEALTH CARE QUALITY 
After a couple of additional class sessions on issues that primarily concern 
patient autonomy (including end of life decision-making and health 
information privacy—we don’t spend much time on these topics, so I urge 
students to take the excellent bioethics and privacy courses offered by my 
adjunct faculty colleagues), we move on to health care quality. Helling v. 
Carey, in which a judge ignored the customary reasonable doctor standard of 
care and instead used a form of cost-benefit analysis to find that failure to 
administer a simple and seemingly cost-free puff test to detect glaucoma could 
amount to malpractice even though all expert witnesses involved agreed that it 
was not common practice among ophthalmologists to perform the test on low-
risk patients, is an excellent cautionary tale to start with.4 I use Vaughn v. 
Menlove (in which the defendant farmer argued that he did his personal best 
and should not be punished for lacking “the highest order of intelligence”) in a 
similar fashion in my torts class.5 The glaucoma test also provides nice 
opportunity to raise the cascade of interventions (in a context that’s slightly 
less personal for me than labor and delivery) before addressing all the messy 
details of high-intervention childbirth using the Furrow casebook’s To Monitor 
or Not problem.6 To Monitor or Not is one of my favorite client advising 
problems, prompting students to think about how to engage their client in a 
 
 2. WENDY E. PARMET, POPULATIONS, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE LAW 191–218 (2009). 
 3. Lindsay F. Wiley, Health Law as Social Justice, 24 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 47 
(2014); Lindsay F. Wiley, From Patient Rights to Health Justice: Securing the Public’s Interest 
in Affordable, High-Quality Health Care, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 833 (2016). 
 4. Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (Wash. 1974). 
 5. Vaughn v. Menlove (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 492; 3 Bing. (N.C.) 468, 471 (C.P.). 
 6. BARRY R. FURROW, THOMAS L. GREANEY, SANDRA H. JOHNSON, TIMOTHY S. JOST & 
ROBERT L. SCHWARTZ, HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS (7th ed. 2013). 
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dialogue about competing concerns and how to navigate the nuances of the 
standard of care for malpractice. 
After a few classes on physician malpractice and hospital liability with 
liberal use of client counseling problems (Creating a Shield, in the Furrow 
book,7 is another favorite), we transition to market-based regulatory 
approaches to improving health care quality. I assign lengthy excerpts from the 
Pennsylvania MCARE Act8 and Joint Commission guidelines9 for students to 
work through in the context of client advising scenarios. After introducing a 
series of cases and sample state scope of practice laws, we spend significant 
time on a client advising problem in which a group of doctors, influenced by 
Medicare payment incentives (spoilers!), wishes to rely more heavily on nurses 
and lay patient care coordinators. When we reflect on those exercises, I like to 
linger on a discussion of the goals of reporting regimes, disciplinary actions, 
and scope of practice laws and how well suited (relative to malpractice liability 
and other alternatives) they are for their purported purposes. This also sets up a 
nice discussion of the relative strengths of primary care physicians, specialists, 
nurses, and other health care professionals and lay support staff from the 
perspective of patient advocates, payers, and the public. 
V.  HEALTH CARE COSTS AND ACCESS 
We begin the unit on costs and access, which makes up about one-half of 
the course, by focusing on the obligations of health care providers to care for 
patients, starting with the formation and termination of the treatment 
relationship and common law obligations of continuing care. We then 
transition to EMTALA,10 focusing on the distinctions between the statute’s 
obligations and the common law framework that predated it. This structure 
allows us to explore broader ideas about the pros and cons of common law 
versus regulatory approaches while also considering the distinction between 
ethical obligations and legal obligations. 
My favorite thing about teaching EMTALA is that it naturally prompts a 
discussion about the mutual aid approach to health care financing. What does it 
mean to require hospitals to provide uncompensated care? If the costs are 
passed along to all patients and payers, then we are talking about a form of 
mutual aid, but a hidden form. An excellent article by Nicole Huberfeld and 
Jessica Roberts11 has given me fresh fodder for this discussion, which 
 
 7. Id. at 431–32. 
 8. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1303.101–1303.1115 (2002). 
 9. THE JOINT COMMISSION, https://www.jointcommission.org [https://perma.cc/8U57-
U6PZ]. 
 10. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2012). 
 11. Nicole Huberfeld & Jessica L. Roberts, Health Care and the Myth of Self Reliance, 57 
B.C. L. REV. 1 (2016). 
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previews all of the different ways that we collectively bear health care costs 
and the wide ranging implications of which health care costs should spur 
mutual aid. And this discussion naturally leads to consideration of why 
policymakers prioritize (often expensive) rescue care over (often less 
expensive) preventive care. 
At this point, I cannot resist sharing the upstream/downstream parable—in 
many ways the foundational myth of public health—with my students. For 
those who don’t have it seared into their brains like I do, the idea is that there 
is a village next to a river. One day, the villagers notice bodies floating by. The 
immediately rush into the water, risking their own lives to fish out the victims 
and resuscitate them. The steady flow of victims never lets up and the villagers 
are so occupied by the valiant effort to rescue them that it doesn’t occur to 
anyone to travel upstream and figure out what’s pushing people in. 
Finally, after much anticipation, we expand our focus to discuss third party 
payers. I assign Deborah Stone’s seminal article12 on mutual aid and actuarial 
fairness (one of very few secondary sources I assign), which reinforces the 
ideas we have generated on our own in the previous class on EMTALA. We 
begin with coverage disputes between individuals and private insurance 
companies. I warn students that coverage disputes will be a unifying theme 
from here on out and that they should pay close attention to how different an 
individual’s options for recourse are depending on whether they have private 
insurance covered by ERISA, private insurance that falls outside ERISA, 
Medicare, or Medicaid. My left-leaning students are sometimes surprised to 
hear me express sympathy for health insurance companies who refuse to cover 
services that patients and their doctors say they need. It takes some effort, but 
not much, to encourage them to see how coverage of expensive services that 
turn out to be unnecessary (e.g., high-dose chemotherapy with autologous bone 
marrow transplant for breast cancer) is an outcome to be avoided. And not only 
because the costs are spread to others. 
They already understand the basics of how a contract dispute against an 
insurer works, so we focus primarily on tort claims against managed care 
organizations. These cases provide a perfect opportunity to discuss the 
blending of financing with treatment decisions and other aspects of health care 
delivery. We focus on the three tools that characterize managed care—limited 
provider networks, primary care providers as gatekeepers, and utilization 
review—rather than being overly concerned with the plethora of labels that 
health plans use to market themselves. After looking at managed care from the 
perspective of tort liability, we shift to state and then federal regulation of the 
practices that define it. Like a mom ruining a perfectly good batch of mac and 
cheese with broccoli florets, I stuff a bit of ERISA preemption in among the 
 
 12. Deborah A. Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH POL. 
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state patient protection statutes, HIPAA portability provisions, and ACA 
underwriting reforms. In addition to several scenarios in which students are 
advocates for insureds against MCOs and vice versa, we do a lengthy problem 
focused on advising an employer working with an insurer to develop a 
wellness incentive program. Although this may seem like a relatively minor 
area of health law, I find that it does a good job of drawing out the nuances of 
“rational” health status-related discrimination, especially in a class where few 
if any students have had the experience of applying for direct-purchase 
insurance pre-ACA. It also gives me a chance to explicitly link our bullseye to 
the original social-ecological model, by way of contrasting it with the 
outmoded behavioral model on which the vast majority of wellness programs 
are based. I dislike the extent to which the Furrow book implies that wellness 
programs are representative of public health intervention. They are not. 
With Medicare, I introduce the distinction between coverage (what a health 
plan covers) and eligibility (who a health plan covers), which everyone needs 
to grasp quickly before we dive into the weeds with Medicaid. Along with our 
discussion of the ACA’s tax penalties and subsidies, these topics allow us to 
explore the role of government in making decisions about coverage and 
eligibility. We also cover Medicare payment reforms in some detail, both so 
that students are well prepared to take a follow-up course on Fraud and Abuse, 
and because value- and quality-based payment models are giving providers a 
greater financial stake in patient outcomes and thus a growing interest in the 
social determinants of health operating upstream in their patient catchment 
areas. In the course of these discussions, we touch on how each of these 
programs bears evidence of policymakers’ reluctance to make decisions about 
health care coverage and payment in a transparent, accountable fashion that 
encourages public engagement and deliberation. 
VI.  PUSHING BEYOND HEALTH CARE 
Ultimately, I only devote one class session to public health law—and not 
only because if I spend more time on it, evaluations will be full of admonitions 
that I focus too much on pet topics. I start with an overarching discussion of 
social disparities in health. We begin with a few cases on overt discrimination 
by health care providers. Students quickly see how inadequate current law is 
for the task of tackling implicit bias, which is far more widespread than overt 
discrimination. And then I really blow their minds by talking about how small 
a role health care plays in determining health outcomes compared to behaviors 
and environmental exposures and the social and economic conditions that 
influence them. This tees up our discussion of public health law, which might 
focus on drug-resistant tuberculosis, racial disparities in cervical cancer, or 
noncommunicable diseases related to poor nutrition and physical inactivity, 
depending on what I’m interested in at the time. 
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CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON LAW AS A TOOL FOR PROMOTING POPULATION 
HEALTH 
I like to use this discussion of public health law to make a broader point 
that is implicit in the entire class, but rarely at the forefront, and one that goes 
hand in hand with the social-ecological model of health: that law can be used 
instrumentally and in an evidenced-based fashion to achieve particular goals. If 
the goal is to preserve the effectiveness of antibiotics or community immunity 
as public goods, there are legal tools for that. If the goal is to avoid iatrogenic 
injuries, then malpractice liability, market-based regulatory regimes, and 
information-based reporting requirements are all potential tools, each with its 
own advantages and limitations, for achieving that goal. If the goal is to ensure 
equitable access to health care, then tax penalties, subsidies, spending 
programs, and direct regulation of private insurers are tools for achieving that. 
Law itself is a determinant of health. If our laws promote equitable access to 
high-quality health care that respects human dignity, then population health 
will benefit. If our laws promote out of control spending on unnecessary and 
sometimes harmful medical interventions and indiscriminate use of 
antimicrobials, they will be to the detriment of public health. 
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